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INTERNATIONAL WATER QUALITY LAW
ALBERT E. UTTON*
In a primitive society, one person consumes in one year the energy
equivalent of 220 pounds of coal. In 1970, the worldwide average per
person was two metric tons. In the United States, the per person
average that year was the equivalent of 11 tons.' The electrical
industry advertises that we will consume more electricity in the
decade of the seventies than has been consumed in all previous human
usage. 2 The human consumption of energy is a litmus paper
indication of overall consumption. The projections are that humankind's production and consumption will triple as its population
doubles.3 Technology and population have combined to pollute the
earth's rivers and streams at accelerating rates. The drainage basins,
by force of gravity, have through the centuries carried way much of
the by-products of the activities of the populations living along the
river banks. But the modern combination of increased population,
increased production, and increased consumption (particularly of
synthetic materials) 4 has brought the pollution to damaging levels. It
is almost not newsworthy to be told: "There is general agreement that
the Danube is polluted in all of its reaches"; 5 that pollution of the
Detroit and Niagara Rivers "imperils the citizens" of both the U.S.
and Canada; 6 or that "[t]he Rhine has become the world's biggest
sewer." 7

Since the flow of river waters follows the dictates of gravity rather
than arbitrary political boundaries, one country's sanitation is
another's poison.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The interdependencies of an international drainage basin make the
pollution of it an imperative concern of international law. This
concern is of recent origin. Smith, in his pioneer book on international
rivers in 1931, could report that, for the most part, books were silent
8
on the subject.
* B.A., University of New Mexico; B.A., M.A., Oxford Univerity. Member of Bar: New
Mexico, England. Professor of Law University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Humpstone, Pollution:Precedent and Prospect, 49 Foreign Affairs 325, 327-28 (1971).
2. Time, Oct. 5, 1970, at 70.
3. Humpstone, supra note 1, at 328.
4. See Commoner, The Causes of Pollution, 13 Environment, April 1971, at 8.
5. Law, Institutions and the Global Evnironment 268 (L. Hargrove Ed. 1972).
6. I.J.C. Report on Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and the Int'l Sectors of the St.
Lawrence River, 2-5 (1970).
7. Denver Post, Feb. 22, 1970, at IG, col. 1.
8. H. Smith, The Economic Uses of International Rivers (1931). However, as early as 1646
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During the relatively recent development of the international law
of drainage basins, four major theories have been expounded as the
basis of the international law governing the rights and obligations of
coriparians:
1. The theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is often expounded to justify action by an upper riparian. According to this theory, an
upper riparian is entitled to do as it chooses with waters within its
boundaries, without regard to its coriparians. The theory, obviously, is
highly attractive to an upper riparian.
2. The antithesis of the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty is
that of absolute territorial integrity. Under this theory, the lower
riparian may demand the continuation of the full flow of the river
from upstream, unaltered both as to quantity and quality.
3. The theory of limited territorial sovereignty lies midway
between the above two. Under this theory, a state may make use of
the waters flowing through its territory insofar as it does not interfere
with their reasonable use by coriparians.
4. Of more recent vintage is the community theory. It holds that
the waters of a drainage basin should be developed as a unit, without
regard to national boundaries. The coriparians should jointly carry out
the development and management of the basin, and the benefits
derived from cooperative development would be shared by the
9
coriparians.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW OF DRAINAGE BASINS
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, given the context
of colonialism, nationalism and gunboat diplomacy, the theory of
absolute territorial sovereignty understandably had some support. In
1895, Judson Harmon, Attorney General of the United States, in
responding to the protest of downstream, coriparian Mexico's protest
of diversion of water from the Rio Grande, proclaimed that "the rules,
principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability or
obligation upon the United States."' 10 In other words, the upper
riparian is entitled to do as it chooses with waters within its
boundaries, without regard to coriparians. As attractive as this
nationalistic approach may be to domestic constituencies, it
Grotius stated: "Thus a river, viewed as a stream, is the property of the people through whose
territory it flows, or the ruler under whose sway that people is. It is permissible for the people or
the king to run a pier into it, and to them all things produced in the river belong." 2 Grotius, De
Jure Belli et Pacis, ch. 2, sec. 12 (Kelsey transl. 1646).
9. See Utton, International Streams and Lakes, 2 Waters and Water Rights 403-04 (R.Clark
ed. 1967); L. Teclaff, The River Basin in History.and Law 152 (1967).
10. Harmon, 21 Op. Att'y. Gen. 274, 283 (1895).
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frequently, to use a phrase, does not hold water, since upper riparians
are also often lower riparians. On the Rio Grande, the U.S. is both an
upper and lower riparian, with Mexico contributing the greater
portion of the waters of the river.1 1 Likewise, the U.S. and Canada are
each upper and lower riparians vis i vis each other. This has helped
develop a healthy self-interest in equitable utilization of international
watercourses, rather than the sovereign impunity of the absolutist
Harmon Doctrine. Accordingly, international practice has not followed the theory of absolute sovereignty. Rather, it has adhered to the
principles of limited territorial sovereignty. This is true not only of
the quantity, but also of the quality of the water.
Although environmental concerns and water quality have not come
into the forefront of our consciousness until the last third of the
twentieth century, international practice was developing precedents
early in the century, limiting international coriparians in their use of
international streams for the disposal of wastes.
Treaty Practice
Even Attorney General Harmon's own country did not follow his
doctrine as early as the Canadian-U.S. Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909, which provides in Article IV that "boundary waters and waters
flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the
injury of health or property of the other." 12 The Boundary Waters
Treaty, along with numerous other treaties, bears witness to the
awareness of water quality problems in general, and the adoption of
the principle of limited territorial sovereignty in particular. The
Commission on Environmental Policy, Law and Legislation of the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN) lists 73 treaties in its files in Bonn that contain
3
provisions to prevent water pollution.'
Even realtively early treaties address themselves specifically to
pollution problems. For example, the 1922 treaty relating to rivers on
the German-Danish border sanctions only such use of the waters as
does not pollute the waters, 14 and provides for liability for damage
caused by industrial waste. 15 More recent treaties almost uniformly
explicitly deal with pollution. For example, the 1959 U.S.-Canadian
A.

11. Hearings on the Treaty with Mexico relating to the utilization of waters of certain rivers
(1945).
before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., at
12. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary Between
the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448; T.S. No. 548.
13. Bibliography, dated Oct. 6, 1965, obtainable from IUCN, 214 Adenauerallee, 53 Bonn,
Germany.
14. Agreement Between Denmark and Germany Relating to Water Courses and Dikes oil the
German-Danish Frontier, Art. 29, Ratified at Berlin, June 7, 1922, 10 L.N.T.S. 187.
15. Id. at Art. 45 & 46.
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St. Lawrence Waterway agreement banned "discharging ashes,
petroleum residues and other matter deleterious to the health"' 16 by
operators, installations and boats; the 1960 Indus River Treaty calls on
both parties "to prevent, as far as possible, such a pollution of the
waters of the rivers which could jeopardize their use as it existed on
the date of entry into force of the Treaty"; 17 and the 1957
Yugoslav-Hungarian Agreement on Fisheries in Frontier Waters
prohibits the discharging of waste water and matter noxious to the fish
population 18 and requires payment of damages for a breach of the
duty. These few examples represent an international practice which
extends geographically from North and South America to Europe,
Africa and Asia, and chronologically from the 1866 Treaty between
Spain and Portugal to the 1972 Great Lakes Agreement between the
U.S. and Canada.' 9
International treaties are important sources of international law in
reflecting general practice accepted as law. As Hyde says "treaties
afford evidence of international law. They do so when they give
20
expression to rules of conduct in which states generally acquiesce."
Existing treaty practice documents, at a minimum, that numerous
nation states have limited their freedom to pollute international
streams and lakes and thereby have practiced the principle of limited
sovereignty. Although the extent of treaty provisions dealing with
pollution may not yet be sufficient to deduce a principle of
international law by itself, 21 this practice, when combined with the
yet more extensive practice dealing in general with international
streams, reinforces the conclusions that these treaties, taken as a
whole, represent international practice from which general rules of
customary international law may be deduced. 22 International practice, as evidenced by treaties, conventions and declarations, demonstrates that the world community adheres to the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty.2 3
Even so, no one would suggest that this is more than a modest
beginning or that-the treaties have achieved more than a modicum of
success. The extent to which the international watercourses of the
world are fouled with pollution starkly testifies to that fact.
16. Section f, Exchange of Notes at Ottawa, Feb. 27, 1959, 341 U.N.T.S. 4.
17. Art. IV (10), Ratifications exchanged Jan. 12, 1961, and took effect retroactively from
April 1, 1960, U.N., St/Leg./Ser. B/12.
18. Art. 5, Entered into force Dec. 24, 1957, U.N., St/Leg./Ser. B/12, p. 837.
19. Reproduced in 11 International Legal Materials 694 (1972).
20. Hyde, International Law Vol. I 12 (2d ed. 1945).
21. See Bourne, InternationalLaw & Pollution of InternationalRivers & Lakes, 6 U.B.C.L.
Rev. 115, 132 (1971).
22. M. McDougal, et al., Law & Public Order in Space 115-19, 811-12(1963).
23. See Utton, supra note 9, at 404.
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B. InternationalJudicial Decisions on Water Quality
The Roman maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus (so use your
own property as not to injure your neighbor) was perceived as the
foundation of the common law of nuisance by Sir William Blackstone
writing early in the nineteenth century. Blackstone illustrated with
the examples that one cannot keep hogs or other "noisome animals"
so near another's house "that the stench of them incommodes him and
makes the air unwholesome" nor can one "corrupt or poison a water
course by erecting a dye-house or a lime pit for the use of trade in the
upper part of the stream." 2 4 Blackstone not only based the principle
on the Roman maxim but the Biblical exhortation as well:"So closely
does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel morality
of 'doing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves.' "25
In 1868 Rylands v. Fletcher built on this principle. The defendant
had built and filled a reservoir; but, unbeknown to him, there was an
abandoned mine beneath the site. The water escaped through the
hidden mineshaft, burst through connecting tunnels and flooded the
plaintiff's coal mine under nearby property. The Appellate Court
held the defendant liable for the damage by saying: "It seems but
reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on
his own property which was not naturally there . . . should be

obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed
in confining it to his own property

. . .

whether the things so

brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches." 2 6 It should be
observed that sic utere tuo is a very broad principle which reaches
nearly platitudinous levels of abstraction; 27 and further, that the
common law itself did not apply the rule inflexibly, but rather tended
to balance the utility of the activity against the gravity of the harm. 2 8
But at a minimum, the common law established that a riparian cannot
act in disregard of his coriparians. Likewise, international law has
followed a similar development in limiting the use of international
rivers. Heading the meager menu of international judicial decisions in
this area is the oft-cited Trail Smelter decision 29 which builds on
Rylands v. Fletcher and would support the same principle of sic utere
tuo for international streams and lakes. 30
The Trail Smelter case dealt with international air pollution, but is
24. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 218 (Chitty ed. 1827).
25. Id.
26. Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 34 L. 330(1868).
27. Lester correctly concludes that "the enunciation of a principle as general as sic utere tuo
is of little use in analyzing complex pollution problems." Lester, River Pollution in International
Law, 57 Am. J.Int'l L. 829, 833 (1963).
28. See Humpstone, supra note 1, at 326-27.
29. 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684 (1941).
30. Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of InternationalRivers, 33 Can. B. Rev. 1018 (1955).
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analagous to the pollution of international streams and lakes. 31 A
smelter at Trail, British Columbia, was causing damage across the
border in the United States. The arbitral tribunal hearing the case
held "that, under the principles of international law . . . no state has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another . . . when the
case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
32
and convincing evidence."
In 1938, the Italian Court of Cassation used sic utere tuo language
in deciding a claim by the French Company, Societe Energie
Electrique du Littoral Mediterranien, that its interests were adversely
affected by the construction on the Italian side of the border of new
power plants by the Italian Compagnia Imprese Elettriche Liguri
The court said:
"International law recognizes the right on the part of every
riparian state to enjoy, as a participant of a kind of partnership
created by the river, all the advantages deriving from it .. .a
State .. .cannot disregard the international duty . .. not to
impede or destroy . .. the opportunity of other States to avail
themselves of the flow of the water for their own national
needs ..... .By these treaties riparian States impose upon
themselves those self-limitations in the exercise of their own
sovereign prerogatives which are regarded as necessary to exclude
reciprocal noxious interference with the concurrent utilization of
the common course of the river." 33
In the Lake Lanoux arbitration between Spain and France, Spain
objected to French hydroelectric plants on the Carol River. Lake
Lanoux lies wholly in France, and it is drained by the River Font-Vive
which in turn flows into the Carol and thence into Spain where it
joins the Segre and ultimately the Ebro. Spain uses the waters for
agriculture. France proposed to divert the waters of the Carol into
the Ariege River via a precipitous 780-meter drop in order to
generate hydroelectric power. Downstream from the project water
equal in quantity and quality would be returned from the Ariege to
the Carol before it entered Spain. The Arbitral Tribunal observed
that the upstream state has, according to the rules of good faith, the
34
obligation to take into consideration the different interests at stake,
31. The Tribunal could find no international case dealing with air pollution, and expressly
relied on a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with water quality because, in the
words of the Tribunal, "The nearest analogy is that of water pollution." 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684,
714 (1941). See discussion at note 36 infra.
32. Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, reproduced in 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 684, 716 (1941).
33. 3 Digest of Int'l Law 1050-51 (1938-39), Annual Digest 120-22 (No. 47).
34. Affaire du Lac Lanoux, Sentence du Tribunal Arbitral, 1957, digested in 53 Am. J. Int'l
L. 156, 170 (1959), 3 Digest of Int'l L. 1069.
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but denied the Spanish claim because there was no alteration in either
the quantity or quality of the water delivered to Spain. One other
international case contains relevant language although the case deals
with neither international rivers nor pollution. The International
Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case asserted "every State's
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other states." 35 Though the volume of
international judicial decisions is meager, they clearly adhere to the
general principle of limited territorial sovereignty.
C. National Judicial Decisionson Water Quality
Although national judicial decisions resolving interstate disputes
are not strictly international decisions, they do provide helpful
guidance to international courts. The deliberations of the Trail
Smelter Tribunal are particularly illuminating in this regard. The
Tribunal relied heavily on U.S. interstate decisions and in so doing
said:
There are, however, as regards both air pollution and water
pollution, certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States which may legitimately be taken as a guide in this field of
international law, for it is reasonable to follow by analogy, in
international cases, precedents established by that court in dealing
with controversies between states of the Union or with other
controversies concerning the quasi-sovereign rights of such states,
where no contrary rule prevails in international law and no reason
for rejecting such precedents can be adduced from the limitations
6
of sovereignty inherent in the Constitution of the United States.3
The U.S. Supreme Court has in fact stated that in sitting "as it were,
as an international, as well as domestic tribunal, we apply Federal
law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the
particular case may demand ... "37
These domestic decisions are not binding international precedent
and one has to be aware of the particular political and institutional
contexts in which the decisions were rendered which affect and shape
the decision. 38 However, as the Trail Smelter decision rightly said,
"They may be legitimately taken as a guide for international law,"
they are "useful, at the very least, for they are examples of sensible
35. Corfu Channel (Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 22.
36. Reports of Int'l Arbitral Awards 1964 (1949).
37. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-147 (1902).
A
38. Goldie, Effect of Existing Uses on Equitable Apportionment of International Rivers II:
Canadian View, I U.B.C.L. Rev. 399, 402 (1960).
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solutions to the conflicting claims of states;" 39 and because the basic
policies, economics, factual situations, ecological and scientific questions "are not essentially different in interstate and international
40
disputes."
The first U.S. case which the Trail Smelter Tribunal referred to was
Missouri v. Illinois.4 1 Missouri sought an injunction to restrain the
discharge of 1500 tons of Chicago sewage daily into the Mississippi
River. However, Missouri also dumped sewage into the river; and the
court refused to grant the injunction because Missouri failed to prove
that it was Chicago's sewage, not Missouri's, which caused the
pollution. Although the anatomical reference may be something less
than accurate, Missouri failed for lack of clean hands.
The Tribunal also considered the 1921 case of New York v. New
Jersey,42 in which New York sought an injunction to restrain New
Jersey from dumping sewage in New York Harbor. The petition was
denied because New York did not meet the standard required by the
court that "the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious
magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence." 4 3 One can easily see the influence of language on the
Tribunal, which required that the pollution be of "serious consequence and established by clear and convincing evidence." 44 Also
relied on was the 1931 New Jersey v. New York 45 case, in which New
Jersey sought to restrain New York from diverting water from the
Delaware which would affect its quality in regard to its use for
sanitation and by increasing its salinity. The court required New York
to modify its plans because "Both states have real and substantial
"46
interests in the River that must be reconciled ...
Thus, although the alleged polluter won in two of the three cases
relied on by the Tribunal, the court recognized that there are
limitations on the use of watercourses that will affect water quality;
and the Tribunal in turn adhered to the principle of limited territorial
sovereignty.
Other national adjudications of interstate disputes use language
broad enough to apply to either water quantity or water quality with
39. Austin, Canadian-U.S.Practiceand Theory Respecting the InternationalLaw of Rivers: A
Study of the History and Influences of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 Can. B. Rev. 393, 432 (1959).
Contra, F. Berber, Rivers in Int'l Law 171-184 (1959).
40. Laylin & Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in Int'l Rivers: The Lake Lanoux Case, 53
Am. J. Int'l L. 156 (1959).
41. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
42. 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
43. Id. at 309.
44. See discussion supra note 29.
45. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
46. Id. at 342-43.
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facility. For example, the federal court of Switzerland, in adjudicating a dispute between the cantons of Zurich and Aargau, established
that in the case of waterways which flow through several cantons, no
canton has the right to undertake measures
on its territory which
47
would be detrimental to another canton.
The dispute between Wurtemberg, Prussia, and Baden over the use
of the waters of the Danube in which Wurtemberg and Prussia were
protesting a diminished flow of the Danube through Wurtemberg, and
which involved quantity rather than quality, called forth from the
court sic utere tuo language broad enough to apply to quality:
"[E]very state is subject to limitations based on general principles of
international law precluding it from infringing the rights of another
member of the international community. No state has the right to
cause substantial injury to the interests of another state by the use it
48
makes of the waters of a natural waterway."
The judicial decisions not only support the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty, but they have gone beyond the simple
principle of limited territorial sovereignty based on the doctrine of sic
utere tuo. They have refined the rather rudimentary limited territorial
sovereignty theory into the "fair share" concept of equitable apportionment or equitable utilization; the concept under which the
benefits to be gained by a use by one nation are balanced against the
cost or damage that would be incurred by other coriparians. In so
doing, they followed the common law development which started
with the absolute sic utere tuo concept of not harming one's neighbor,
but which was mitigated by the pragmatic balancing of the costs as
opposed to the benefits. Sic utere tuo became "do not harm thy
neighbor unless the social utility outweighs the gravity of the harm."
The common law, even before and after Blackstone quoted the maxim
sic utere tuo as the foundation of the law of nuisance, "tended to
disregard the maxim where the lawbreaker was ,using his land in a
common and socially useful way . . ." and to invoke it when the use
49
was careless or unproductive.
The court in New Jersey v. New York said, "the effort always is to
secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas." 50 In the Wurtemberg case, the court said, "The interests of the
States in question must be weighed in an equitable manner against
one another. One must consider not only the absolute injury caused to
a neighboring state, but also the relation of the advantage gained by
47.
48.
49.
50.

15 Am. J. Int'l L. 149, 160 (1921).
Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-28).
Humpstone, supra note 1,at 326.
283 U.S. 336 (1931).
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one to the injury caused to the other." 5 1 The Indus Commission, in
settling the dispute betwween the Provinces of Sind and Punjab over
the waters of the Indus, said that all riparians must get a "fair share of
the common river." 52 Likewise, the Tribunal in the Trail Smelter
arbitration prohibited transboundary air pollution "when the case is
of serious consequence," thus allowing a consideration of the gravity
of the harm and presumably a balancing of that against the utility of
the offending conduct.
As to what guidelines the courts should follow in balancing the
costs and benefits, the Staatsgerichtshof in the Wurtemberg case said
the decision "is governed by the circumstances of each particular
case." 53 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming
said numerous factors must be considered, including "the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits of downstream areas if a limitation
is imposed on the former. . .. "54 The ideal of equitable utilization
should be that the waters of the drainage basin be utilized so as to
maximize the benefits to each coriparian state while minimizing the
detriments to each.
D. Statements and Resolutions By Private InternationalBodies
A major role in the formulation of principles of international law is
played by private bodies made up of scholars, practitioners and
governmental officials. Their activities are subsumed under that part
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which says the
court shall consider the teachings of the most highly qualified
55
publicists of the various nations.
In this context, the International Law Association has made a
56
singular contribution to the International Law of Water Quality,
culminating ten years of work with the Helsinki Rules promulgated at
its 1966 conference in Finland. 57 The need for more definitive
elaboration of rules for the resolution of disputes relating to the
utilization of international drainage basins was imperative in view of
the increasing use being demanded of water resources. Increasingly,
extremely general principles such as sic utere tuo and the doctrine of
51. Supra note 46.
52. Report of Indus Commission 10-11 (1942).
53. Supra note 48.
54. 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
55. I.C.J. Stat. 1 art. 38.
56. See also 1961 Salzburg Resolution of the International Institute of International Law, 49
Annuaire de l'Institute de Droit International, Tome II 381.
57. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Int'l Law Ass'n (London
1967 [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
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limited territorial sovereignty were of little use in "analyzing
'5 8
complex pollution problems."
The Helsinki Rules are the most definitive expression of the
international law of rivers. The rules assume limited territorial
sovereignty and are founded on the principle of equitable utilization.
Article IV provides that: "Each basin State is entitled, within its
territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of
the waters of an international drainage basin." 59
Article V goes on follow the lead of earlier judicial decisions 60 by
elaborating: "What is a reasonable and equitable share within the
meaning of Article IV is to be determined in the light of all the
61
relevant factors in each particular case."
The Helsinki Rules specifically address water pollution, which is
defined as "any detrimental change resulting from human conduct in
the natural composition, content, or quality of the waters of an
international drainage basin." 62 The Rules expressly articulate international water quality obligations:
Article X. 1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin, a State (a)
must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in
the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage
basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a
cobasin State, and (b) should take all reasonable measures to abate
existing water pollution in an international drainage basin to such
an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a
cobasin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to
water pollution originating: (a) within a territory of the State, or
(b) outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's
conduct.
Article XI. 1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in
paragraph 1(a) of Article X of this Chapter, the State responsible
shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and compensate
the injured cobasin State for the injury that has been caused to it.
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph 1(b) of
Article X, if a State failed to take reasonbale measures, it shall be
required promptly to enter into negotiations with the injured
State with a view toward reaching a settlement equitable under
the circumstances.
The Helsinki Rules were preceded by earlier formulations such as
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Lester, supr note 27, at 833.
Helsinki Rules.
See discussion supra note 31.
Helsinki Rules, at Art. V.
Helsinki Rules, at Art. IX.
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the 1911 Madrid Declaration of the Institut de Droit International
which proscribed "all alterations injurious to the water" and "the
emptying therein of injurious matter." 63 Also, the Madrid Declaration
prohibited the taking of water such that "the utilizable or essential
character of the stream shall, when it reaches territory downstream,
be seriously modified." 64 This latter provision has relevance to salinity
and sanitation questions in which the dilution factor is important. The
1961 Resolution of the Institut further supported the principle of
limited sovereignty stating:
Every state has the right to utilize waters which traverse or border
its territory, subject to the limitations of international law .. .
The right is limited by the right of utilization of other states
interested in the same watercourse or hydrographic basin. 65
In 1957, the Inter-American Bar Association affirmed the same
principle in language broad enough in scope to cover both quality and
quantity of water. It declared:
States having under their jurisdiction part of a system of
international waters are under a duty to refrain from making
changes in the existing regime that might affect adversely the
advantageous use by one or more
other states having a part of the
66
system under their jurisdiction.
E. Statements of Public InternationalBodies
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
at Stockholm issued a Declaration on the Human Environment. It
proclaims in Principle 21 that States have the "responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
67
limits of national jurisdiction.
This statement is a crystallization of international practice adopting the general principle of limited territorial sovereignty in regard to
the utilization of international drainage basins. However, it echoes
much more the sound of the earlier inflexible sic utere tuo formulation
than the more sophisticated equitable utilization language of the
Helsinki Rules.
The U.N. statement is one of general principle. It is laudable as
such; but the resolution of complex international environmental
disputes will require the elaboration of much more precise and
63. 24 Annuaire de l'Institute de Droit International 365-67 (1911).
64. Id. at 170.
65. Art. 2, Utilization of Non-Maritime Int'l Waters, Institute de Droit International (1961).
66. Principles of Law Governing the Uses of International Rivers and Lakes-Resolution
Adopted by Inter-American Bar Association Conference (1957).
67. Dept. State Bull. 118 (1972).
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detailed rules, both substantive and procedural, such as those
contained in the Helsinki Rules.
F. Individual Authorities
Individual scholars likewise espouse the concept of limited territorial sovereignty which limits a nation's freedom to pollute the
waters of a politically divided basin. Lester speaks of a presumptive
rule "that every state is bound to use the waters flowing within its
territory in such a manner as will not cause substantial injury to a
co-riparian state." 68 The 1955 statement of Lauterpacht is a
straightforward limited territorial sovereignty-sic utere tuo formulation:
.. . It is a rule of international law that no state is allowed to
alter the natural condition of its own territory to the disadvantage
of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighboring State.
For this reason, a State is not only forbidden to stop or divert the
flow of a river which runs from its own to a neighboring State, but
likewise to make such use of the water of the river as either causes
danger to the neighboring State or prevents it from making
proper use of the flow of the river on its part. 69
Scholars have further refined the principle of limited territorial
sovereignty into the more sophisticated concept of equitable utilization. For example, Griffin in 1959 supported the limited territorial
sovereignty principle but further developed it by using the language
of equitable utilization in declaring "a riparian has the sovereign right
to make maximum use" of international waters within its borders,
limited by "the corresponding right of each coriparian" and that
"riparians are entitled to share in the use and benefits of a system of
international waters on a just and reasonable basis." 70
In 1963, Professor Waldock reflected the same maturing of the
principle in stating that "each state has the right to have that river
system considered as a whole, and to have its own interests taken into
71
account with those of other states."
Jerome Lipper, in summing up the conclusions of the New York
University International Rivers Research Project says that international authority "endorses the limited sovereignty principle which
embraces equitable utilization, as it is sometimes termed equitable
apportionment, with respect to both contiguous and successive
72
international rivers."
68. The Law of International Drainage Basins 113 (A. Garretson, et al. eds. 1967).
69. Oppeheim's International Law 474-75 (Lauderpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955).
70. Griffin, The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Customary
InternationalLaw, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 77-79 (1959).
71. Brierly, The Law of Nations 231 (6th ed. Waldock 1963).
72. Garretson, et al., supra note 68, at 62-63.
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EQUITABLE UTILIZATION
From the vantage of the last third of the twentieth century, it can
reasonably be said that international practice as evidenced by
treaties, judicial decisions, the statements of individual scholars, and
private and public international bodies, has rejected the assertion of
absolute territorial sovereignty in favor of the principle of limited
territorial sovereignty. Escaping from the absolutist Harmon Doctrine
and resisting some modern assertions, 73 the international community,
like the common law, adopted the concept of sic utere tuo requiring a
riparian to use its part of an international drainage basin so as not to
injure its coriparians. Then, this was further refined by requiring an
equitable balancing of the costs and benefits of proposed uses of water
resources-the doctrine of equitable utilization. Thus international
law, like the common law, 74 modified an inflexible sic utere tuo which
would proscribe any use which would damage a coriparian in favor of
a flexible balancing of the costs and benefits of each use so as to
"satisfy the needs of coriparian states to the greatest extent possible
while maximizing the benefits and minimizing the detriments to
each. "5

The Helsinki Rules adopt sic utere tuo language in prohibiting "any
new form of water pollution . . . which would cause substantial

injury in the territory of a cobasin state," but qualifies it by allowing
pollution which is "consistent with the principle of equitable
utilization."7 6 Under the Helsinki Rules, a state does not commit a
delict and therefore is not legally liable for a utilization of the
drainage basin which causes (1) no damage to the coriparian; (2)
minor damage to the coriparian; (3) nor even substantial damage to
the coriparian 77 if the utilization is within the fair share of the user.
This rather anomalous position arises in the case of pollution
because not only does Article X require that the damage be
"substantial," but it makes all water pollution, new or existing,
subject to the "principle of equitable utilization." The I.L.A. in its
commentary on Article X and this dominant principle elucidated
that:
The optimum goal of international drainage basin development is
73. Indian writers espoused the Harmon Doctrine during the dispute with Pakistan over the
waters of the Indus. S. Kril (Advocate-General Punjab), I.L.A. Comm., 1st Rep. (1956); Bains,
The Diversion of International Rivers, 1 Indian J. Int'l L. 39, 44 (1960); McDougall, The
Development of InternationalLaw With Respect to Trans-Boundary Water Resources, Cooperation for Mutual Advantage or Continentalism's Thin Edge of the Wedge?, 9 Osgood Hall L.J. 261
(1971).
74. See Humpstone, supra note 1, at 332.
75. Garretson, et al., supra note 68 at 45.
76. Helsinki Rules, supra at Art. X.
77. See Bourne, supra note 21, at 123-24.
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to accommodate the multiple and diverse uses of the cobasin
States. The concept of equitable utilization of the waters of an
international drainage basin has the purpose of promoting such an
accommodation. Thus, uses of the waters by a basin State that
cause pollution resulting in injury in a cobasin State must be
considered from the overall perspective of what constitutes an
equitable utilization. Any use of water by a basin State . . . that
denies an equitable sharing of uses by a cobasin State . . . is in

violation of international law. By parallel reasoning, a State that
engages in a use or uses causing pollution is not required to take
measures with respect to such pollution that would deprive it of
8
7

equitable utilization.
Thus international law has not adopted a no-injury, no-pollution
80
release rule;7 9 it has not adopted a principle of absolute liability;
but rather a requirement of reasonableness, an equitable balancing.
The Helsinki Rules, in adopting equitable utilization, also rejected
the doctrine of prior appropriation which asserts the old equity
principle of "first in time, first in right" whereby he who appropriated
the water first perfected his title in it. 81 Likewise, the similar concept
of international servitudes was rejected. Under this concept, an tipper
riparian acquired a servitude to pollute water flowing into a lower
riparian. The latter would be the subservient state, and permanently
restricted in the use of the waters flowing into it. Whether this
82
concept ever was accepted as international law is subject to doubt,
but the Helsinki Rules leave no doubt that they reject such permanent
restraints in favor of the flexible, cost-benefit analysis of equitable
utilization.
Article X on pollution does contain something of a "grandfather
clause" for existing pollution. Article X calls for the prevention of
new pollution, but only "all reasonable measures to abate existing
water pollution" or prompt negotiations with the injured state if the
polluter "fails to take reasonable measures." This more indulgent
attitude toward existing pollution probably reflects political realities;
but, under the first sentence of Article X, all pollution, new or
existing, must be "consistent with the principle of equitable utilization." Any pollution, either new or existing which denies a cobasin
state its fair share of the resource must be inconsistent with the
principle of equitable utilization. To use the I.L.A. Committee's own
78. Helsinki Rules, at 499.
79. See Humpstone, supra note 1, at 332.
80. Coldie, Development of an InternationalEnvironmental Latv-An Appraisal, in Law,
Institutions and the Global Environment 133 (L. Hargrove ed. 1972); Lester, supra note 27, at
849-52.
81. R. Clark, 1 Waters and Water Rights 33 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
82. Lester, supra note 27,at 834.
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words in its commentary on Article X, "Any use of water by a basin
State . . . that denies an equitable sharing of uses by a co-basin
State . . . is in violation of international law. A use that causes
pollution to the extent of depriving a co-basin State of an equitable
share stands on the same basis." It will be up to later judicial decision
to build a body of interpretation as to what is an "equitable share;"
but the emphasis would seem to be on the cobasin state's equitable
share rather than on the polluter's cost of abatement, although the
further qualification must be added that this cost must be considered
in determining what is equitable and what is a "reasonable measure
to abate." 83 No one could successfully make unreasonable abatement
demands on the polluter, but neither should an injured co-basin state
be deprived of its fair utilizable share of the resource just because of
the timing of the pollution. A polluter's hands are not made clean just
because he has polluted for a long time.
THE UNCERTAINTIES OF EQUITABLE UTILIZATION
This step from the sovereign impunity of the Harmon Doctrine to
84 is a conthe reasonable man doctrine of equitable utilization
siderable one. Its significance should not be underestimated, but it
criticism of uncertainty. Professor Bourne calls it
is subject to the
"rather vague. '"85 Professor Van Alstyne charges "that the same
platitudinous quality which makes it so agreeable also makes it
disturbingly vague and uncertain" 86 and that it is nothing more than
an appeal to the international conscience. 87 The principle of equitable utilization needs to be further elaborated, both by the promulgation of more precise rules, both substantive and procedural, and by a
body of interpretive judicial decisions. 8 8 However, the problem is not
the concept but the inadequacy of the institutions to apply it. In fact,
the very strength of the concept is its elasticity-its very lack of
rigidity.
In administering the water resources of a drainage basin, flexibility
is much preferable to a "corpus of rigid norms." 89 Each drainage
83. See Bourne, supra note 21, at 126-27.
84. Bourne, supra note 21, at 12
85. Id.
86. He actually used the earlier term "equitable apportionment." Van Alstyne, International
Law and Interstate River Disputes, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 596, 617 (1960).
87. Van Alstyne, The Iusticiability of International River Disputes: A Study in the Case
Method, Duke L.J. 309 (1964).
88. Prof. Bourne refers to the Helsinki Rules as "rudimentary," supra note 21, at 135. Prof.
Jordan characterizes the current state of development of international drainage basin law as
"'embryonic." Jordon, Recent Developments in InternationalEnvironmental Control, 15 McGill
L.J. 279, 285 (1970). Anthony Lester concludes that "the relevant international law [is]
not . . . well developed." Garretson, et al., supra note 68, at 94.
89. Utton, supra note 9, at 427.
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basin is a unique entity, and although, of course, the experience of one
basin can be valuable to another basin, each basin has its own
economic, geographic, ecological, cultural and political variables; no
comprehensive system of rigid rules can anticipate adequately the
variables from basin to basin.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Wyoming cited numerous
factors that must be considered in achieving "the delicate adjustment
of interests which must be made" 90 in each case; and Article V of the
Helsinki Rules provides that what is reasonable and equitable shall
"be determined in the light of all relevant factors in each particular
case." The Court in New Jersey v. New York established the correct
posture in saying "the effort always is to secure equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas." 9 1
The Helsinki Rules further elaborate a set of relevant variables to
be considered by the decision-maker and preserve the necessary
flexibility for the decision-maker in the particular case by declaring
that "the weight to be given each factor is to be determined92 by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors."
Although the doctrine is elastic, it guides decision-makers to
relevant policy considerations. It provides sufficient guidance to
render future drainage basin disputes fully justiciable, 93 while at the
90. 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
91. 283 U.S. 336, 343(1931).
92. Helsinki Rules, at Art. V provides the following test of factors to be considered:
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution
of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in
particular existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent of the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
(j) the practicablility of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State;
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining
what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered
together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
93. Van Alstyne, supra note 87, at 307-08.
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same time providing ample flexibility for the decision-maker through
a creative, common law process to meet the peculiarities of each
basin, and to allow for the changing conditions that advancing
technology will present.
The Helsinki Rules do, at a very minimum, establish a significant
set of rules for the resolution of drainage basin disputes by decision-makers, but for what decision-makers, when, and where?
THE INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION OF DRAINAGE BASINS
The prime weakness of the principle of equitable utilization is not
the generality of the concept itself, but the primitive state of the
institutions to apply it. The Helsinki Rules are undoubtedly helpful in
providing a framework of community expectations in the claim-response process of foreign office negotiations; and the rules will be
helpful to tribunals in those few situations where the parties can agree
to third party adjudication. However, the number of adjudications of
94
international water disputes in the past has been meager.
The number of times the parties have been able to agree to
arbitration is small, although the few decisions, such as the Trail
Smelter, have been important; and the lack of compulsory jurisdiction
has made the International Court of Justice more a spectator than a
participant.
Even so, judicial tribunals are not the best instruments for
administering international drainage basins. They are largely after the
fact, and episodic; 95 and, in pollution cases, what is needed more than
punishment after the fact is ongoing administrative machinery which
will prevent the pollution before it occurs.
Certainly a set of rules like the Helsinki Rules is needed for the
adjudication of disputes over the violation of the prohibitions against
damage by pollution. But such adjudications are by definition after
the fact, after the damage is caused; or even if some anticipatory
injunctive relief were possible to prevent imminently threatened
damage, it would still be on an ad hoc case-by-case basis. 96
What is needed is an administrative process, a basin authority
94. See discussion, supra note 27.
95. Even on the level of determining liability for pollution after-the-fact adjudication faces
difficult factual determinations. Tribunals can cope quite adequately with pollution damage
arising in a straightforward transboundary river situation where the water and therefore the
pollution flows successively from one state into another. Jordan, supra note 86, at 288. But the
evidentiary problems of determining the source of pollution and therefore liability in a complex
basin situation such as the Great Lakes is not so amenable to simple proof. This statement
remains valid in spite of the fact that the Permanent Court of International Justice did deal
successfully with a complexity of conflicting uses in the case of Diversion of Waters From the
Meuse, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937).
96. The Trail Smelter Tribunal did grant injunctive relief as well as damages. 33 Am. J. Int'l
L. 182 (1939).
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which could supervise, and make ongoing policy decisions for the best
management of the resource. Adjudication would continue to play a
role when violations and utilization rights are at issue, but a larger
role would be played by ongoing supervision and policy making.
Particularly in cases of ecological damage, compensation after the
event may be of little avail. Ongoing preventive management and
control is the reasonable institutional arrangement. The quest must be
for continuous policy to make continuing adjustments to changing
conditions and new technology, to provide ongoing supervision and
enforcement, and to make the best use of the resource. Informed
opinion correctly and strongly supports the idea of the management
of international fresh water resources, rather than relying principally
97
on ad hoc international negotiations or after the fact adjudication.
However, international institutions have not yet reached that stage
of maturity. We have escaped from the absolutism of the Harmon
Doctrine, but we have not yet reached the stage of international
management.
Cano, in his study of Latin America, found that the treaties of South
America without exception do not provide for joint ownership or joint
management, but rather "each country has retained its sovereignty
and thus responsibility for administering those parts of the works
situated on its side of the frontier." 98 Professor Teclaff, in his
exhaustive study of the river basins, concludes that existing international "basin commissions are primarily consultative bodies" with
weak future planning machinery and no power to make binding
decisions. 99 The Rhine has had the Central Commission for the
Navigation of the Rhine since 1815100 but it is limited in dealing with
environmental problems since its jurisdiction is restricted to navigation. 10 1 In 1963, a second Rhine Commission, the International
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, was
97. The International Law Association recognizes the importance of international agencies
in providing solutions to international drainage. Helsinki Rules 45-50 Lester observes that
"[mjost of the world's water resources lack systems of joint control . . . so that the need is as
great for the development of administrative organization as for legal norms for the settlement of
disputes." River Pollution in International Law 57 Am. J. Int'l L. 828, 841 (1963). Professor
Jordan urges the establishment of "a regime whereby states recognize the obligation to
cooperate to mitigate the causes of international water pollution." Jordan, supra note 88, at 289.
Professor Bourne sees the rules of customary international law being superseded by "treaties
providing for the management and control of international drainage basins by international joint
agencies." Bourne, supra note 21, at 136.
98. Cano, Preliminary Review of Questions Relating to the Development of International
River Basins in Latin American, UNECOSOC Report, Economic Commission for Latin
America, 8th Sess. [UN Doc. E/CN 12/511, at 26 (1959)].
99. L. Teclaff, supra note 9, at 178. See also Ely and Wollman, Administmtion, in the Law of
International Drainage Basins 136 (A. Garretson, et al., eds. 1967).
100. Congress of Vienna, Final Act, June 7, 1815, Arts. 108, 109, 2 Martens N.R. 427.
101. Stein, supra note 5, at 265.
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created.1 0 2 But the new Commission is largely advisory in nature. It
can research and analyze pollution, 10 3 but for other matters must
await what the signatory nations by agreement may refer to it.104
Stein observes that "faced with serious problems, the four riparian
states were not sufficiently willing to internationalize the management functions because their interests were different and the impetus
for the new commission was largely the idea of one state."' 10 5 The
Danube has had an international commission since it was created by
the Congress of Paris of 1856.106 The Commission has done much
work in coordinating such activities as hydrologic services, flood
control, hydroelectic planning, river inspection, navigation and
sanitation; but, to date, "riparian states coordinate with one another
within their own reach of the river rather than meeting as a collegial
10 7
body to consider the problems of the Danube as a whole.'
Austria opposes international administration of the river because, as
an upper riparian, she is "a major contributor of pollution flowing
into Hungary. There are no waste treatment facilities in the capital
city of Vienna, or in Linz," and there will be none "until after
1980."108 The Soviet Union also opposes international administration
of the Danube, "basing their position on the concept of sovereignty
and sovereign equality. They consider that international solutions
consist only of coordination of national policies." 109 Even most
recently, between two countries with a long history of amicable
relations and cooperation and with as much commonality of culture,
economy and tradition as one may expect to find in the world-the
United States and Canada-in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement" 0 we find that, although the role of the International Joint
Commission is strengthened, it is still largely restricted to coordination, monitoring, and surveillance. As Professor Builder observes, "the
Agreement's concept and structure is still primarily binational
cooperation rather than international regulation." 1" The International Joint Commission has done important work. 112 Its contribution
in pollution control should not be minimized. Professor Bourne calls
102. 3 Whiteman, Digest of Int'l Law 1045 (1964).
103. International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine, Art. 2.
104. Id. at Art. 6(2).
105. Supra note 5, at 267.
106. Supra note 5, at 268 for a brief historical discussion.
107. Supra note 5, see also remark of Judge Kulz, Report of Fiftieth Conference of the Int'l
Law Ass'n 417-18 (Brussels, 1962).
108. Supra note 5, at 269.
109. Id.
110. 11 Int'l Legal Materials 694 (1972).
111. Supra note 5, at 343.
112. See Ross, National Sovereignty and InternationalEnvironmental Decisions, 12 Natural
Resources J. 242 (1972).
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the Commission "the best of its kind anywhere," but with its
jurisdiction "strictly limited to investigation and recommendation" it
has not been able to "stem the increasing deterioration" of
U.S.-Canadian boundary waters. 113
He therefore states that drastic measures must be taken to control
the pollution either by domestic legislation or by endowing "the IJC
or some similar body with powers, perhaps legislative and judicial,
'
sufficiently wide to enable it to exercise the necessary control. "114
The 1972 Agreement has not so endowed the I.J.C. or any other body.
Professor Builder correctly concludes that "governments will be
reluctant to subject their flexibility and freedom of action . . . to
international constraints . . . and may often prefer loose cooperative
arrangements,- 115 and Ely and Wolman consider the establishment of
116
supranational pollution control commissions to be utopian.
Given that we have developed a set of customary international
rules for dealing with river disputes on the basis of equitable
utilization, but are not yet ready to accept international administration of river resources, where do we go from here? First, the outlook is
not completely bleak. There is a general consensus already developed
among knowledgeable commentators which creates a climate of
conventional wisdom within which future policy decisions will be
made. Secondly, as Professor Teclaff documents, there is already a
prevailing trend in national law "toward treating the river basin as a
unit for planning and administration. "117 In the United States, there is
the trend from private rights to public control and management by
agencies established by interstate compact. 118 In Canada, Professor
Bourne points to the intergovernmental agreement between Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and the federal government, 119 the Canada
Water Act, which provides for international, inter-provincial, and
perhaps extra-provincial management and control agencies for
120
drainage basins.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AS CATALYST
AND THE TWO-TIER APPROACH
For the forseeable future, planners are going to have to deal with
the environment in the context of a loose federation of sovereign
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Bourne, supra note 21, at 135.
Id.
Supra note 5, at 34849,
Garretson, etal., supra note 68, at 145.
L. Teclaff, supra note 9, at 119.
3 Water and Water Rights 33248 (R.E. Clark ed. 1967).
Bourne, supra note 21, at 136.
Canada Water Act, S.C. 1969-70, c. 52.
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states. States are going to be reluctant to give up their sovereign
control over resources within their boundaries;' 2 ' legitimately they
are going to demand political accountability from the international
agencies which are created. They are going to be more attracted to
flexible, open-ended, cooperative arrangements. 122 Supranational
23
drainage basin authorities, therefore, are largely utopian.1
Therefore, in the management of international drainage basins, we
must, at least in the short range, develop international commissions
that use persuasion rather than coercion to plan and manage the
basin. The best design may be a hierarchical two-tier approach in
which the international entity acts as a catalyst by acquiring
information, formulating policy recommendations and disseminating
both to the cobasin states which in fact will execute policy and
regulate the resource. The international basin commission will act as
catalyst, a "motive force" to stimulate the basin states to carry out
coordinate policies of management and control. The suggestions that
Professor Chayes makes for global environmental questions, have
relevance to the administration of drainage basins.
For global environmental questions, Professor Chayes suggests two
institutions: "on the political side, a high level policy planning and
coordinating office; on the scientific side, a world institute for
scientific advice and research on the environment.' 1 4 The basin
Commission would focus on policy planning and review, and would
maintain an ongoing overview of the activities of all basin states and
other international organizations. It would identify gaps, overlaps,
and needed programs and make recommendations as to priorities,
standards, and goals. It would assemble, analyze and disseminate
information regarding the environmental aspects of the activities of
cobasin states and their citizens. It could initiate studies, carry on
on-site inspections, hold hearings and provide a forum for the
exploration of basin problems and the crystallization of basin
expectations-a forum for a basin political consensus. It is imperative
that the basin commission have authority and staff to initiate scientific
and planning studies on its own without having to await " a
reference" from the basin governments. The 1972 Great Lakes
Agreement does in fact make a significant stride forward in authorizing such self-initiative to the I.J.C. 125 It would need to be supported
by a scientific component that would supply unbiased data of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Supra note 5, at 34849.
Id.
Ely and Wollman, supra note 99, at 145,
Supra note 5, at 12.
Art. VI(c), reproduced in 11 Int'l Legal Materials 694 (1972).
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unsurpassed credibility. Professor Chayes suggests a scientific institute
organized and operated by the scientific community itself.
The execution of the environmental policy would be principally in
the hands of the cobasin states. The power of the environmental basin
commission would be the power to persuade, backed by detailed
knowledge based on the best scientific information and planning
thinking available. The international commission would not have
regulatory competence because in Professor Chayes' words, " that is
as it must be in a world still constituted of sovereign and independent
126
states."
Zdenek Slonka sees the management process in a similar twofold
division of policy assessment and resource regulation. "Assessment is a
12 7
cognitive process, regulation a political one."
At the global level, he sees them fused together to form
a single two-tier process in which the understandings,
apprehensions and goals, continuously articulated, assessed and
re-evaluated on the global level, are allowed to seep down to the
second tier of the subsystems and gently civilize the harsh but
unavoidable particular solutions to which individual
states,
128
pressed by technological flux, will increasingly resort.
For international environmental problems in general, he posits the
need:
. . . to see the two levels of decision-making as a hierarchical
structure in which the global level guides and modifies the lower.
In order to obtain policy action at a speed commensurate with
that of technological change, and at the same time not to end up
with an amorphous mass of inequalities and self-centered practices with low levels of international responsiveness, the action has
to start from below-guided by the light coming from the global
assessment process above, however dim and flickering that light
may be. 129
In fact, the Stockholm Conference has taken a potentially important step in this regard. It follows the two-tier approach of "agency as
catalyst" in its resolution on Institutional Arrangements. It recommends the establishment of a Council for Environmental Affairs of 54
members with a smaller secretariat which "is to provide a general
policy guidance . . . to keep under review the world environmental
situation . . . promote the . . . acquisition, assessment and exchange of environmental knowledge . . . to maintain under continu126.
127.
128.
129.

Supra note 5, at 25.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
Id.
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ing review the impact of national and international environmental
0
policies."'13
Since such a two-tiered "carrot" approach relies on persuasion, the
prestige and credibility of the agency and its scientific information is
imperative. Knowlege is power only if it is well founded and seen to
be politically impartial.
Governments will ultimately only act out of informed self-interest,
. . . bringing the power of knowledge to bear on governments
cannot rest on any naive assumption that individual governments,
if only they are confronted with the facts, will perceive the
common good and pursue it even at the expense of more
immediate and narrowly national policy objectives . . . .But the
power of that knowledge to move governments stems from a
grasp by policy-makers of the full panoply of consequences that
may flow from a failure to adjust national policy so as to take it
into account; not simply consequences injurious to the environment; but political consequences both international and domestic,
economic consequences, repercussions for a government's moral
stature or prestige, and perhaps others. 131
The efforts of the basin commission must be not only to gather
scientific information, and suggest policy alternatives, but it also must
keep uppermost the goal of carrying out its functions so as to
maximize the political response by the basin states in carrying out
coordinate basin policies.
The agency ideally should be able to respond to the speed of
technological change, but it must be recognized that a two-tier
process of persuasion as opposed to a process of coercion greatly
complicates and limits prompt response. However, such will be the
situation in an international community of loosely associated sovereign states such as we have in the latter third of the twentieth
century.
PRIOR NOTICE AND PLANNING CONSULTATION
There is also much for international lawyers to do in refining and
elaborating the Helsinki Rules both procedurally and substantively.
They are, undoubtedly, just an embryonic beginning, in view of the
growing complexity of drainage basin usage. Since the application of
customary rules takes place largely after the event, the procedures for
prior notice and consultation must be strengthened so as to bring
coriparians into development decisions at an early planning stage in
any proposal which has the potential for affecting coriparians
environmentally.
130.
5, 67, Dep't State Bull. 115 (1972).
131. Supra note 5, at 175.
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There has been some support for a requirement of prior consent.
This is essentially a reference to the theory of absolute territorial
integrity. A lower riparian would have a veto over all upstream
developments and could thereby demand.the continuation of the full
flow of the river, unaltered both as to quality and quantity. Professor
Van Alstyne cites a number of treaties which do require prior
consent, 132 and this treaty practice has been appealed to in some
disputes, e.g., by the Pakistanis in responding to the Indians' claims of
absolute territorial sovereignty over the waters of the Indus. 133 But
this absolutist position, along with its absolutist opposite, the Harmon
Doctrine, has been rejected by the Lake Lanoux Tribunal 134 and by
the Helsinki Rules in favor of a reasonable use doctrine-that of
equitable utilization.
However, reasonableness would require prior notice and consultation. A riparian, to satisfy minimal standards of reasonableness, must
notify coriparians who might be adversely affected by proposed
developments or activities. In answering the question of which
coriparians might be adversely affected and thereby notified, the
classic statement of Lord Atkin in Donaghue v. Stevenson 135 might
well be used by substituting the word "coriparian" for "person." Who
then must be notified? "Coriparians who are so closely and directly
affected by my act [or may be so affected] that I ought reasonably to
have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing
my mind to the acts or omissions which are called into question."
What should the notice contain? The notice must contain sufficient
technical information so that the coriparian may make an independent judgment of the impact of the proposal in economic, ecologic,
and esthetic terms; and in order to make the notice meaningful, all
interested coriparians should be provided an opportunity after notice
for consultation and negotiation in order that they may make
132. Van Alstyne, supra note 86, at 596.
133. Bains, The Diversion of InternationalRivers, 1 Indian J. Int'l L. 38, 44 (1960).
134. Exactly this issue was presented to the Tribunal in the Lake Lanoux arbitration. See
discussion supra note 34. Spain contended that the proposed hydroelectric project could not be
undertaken without her consent under the Treaty of Bayonne and its Acte Additional of 1866,
56 Brit. and For. State Papers 212, United Nations Legislative Series, Legislative Texts and
Treaty Provisions Concerning the Utilization of International Rivers for Other Purposes than
Navigation 671-672 (ST/LEG/SER.B/12). The Tribunal rejected the Spanish assertion and
instead looked to whether the action unreasonably altered the quantity or quality of the river.
The Tribunal said, "It could have been argued that the works would bring about a definite
pollution of the waters of the Carol or that the returned waters would have a chemical
composition or a temperature or some other characteristic which could injure Spanish
interests." 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 156 (1959). But since such arguments of actual harm were not
advanced, the Tribunal said it would accept the assertion that prior consent was required only if
there was "clear and convincing evidence to that effect." 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 163 (1959).
135. [1932] A.C. 579.
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available any information or consideration they may have developed.
In fact, there is considerable international practice observing prior
notice and consultation. In 1960, the U.S. proposed to put 350 million
needles in orbit as relayers of communications signals. The U.S.
offered to enter into "appropriate international consultations before
proceeding with space activity if it had reason to believe that its
activity may create significant risk of harm." 136 In the case of weather
modification, the U.S. has gone even farther and recognized the need
not to proceed with activities that might affect the weather of other
nations without prior agreement. 137 Also, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1956 contains notice and consultation provisions by
requiring that:
Whenever the Secretary (of the Interior) upon receipt of reports,

surveys, or studies from any duly constituted international agency,
has reason to believe that any pollution [of interstate or navigable
waters] which endangers the health or welfare of persons in a

foreign country is occurring, and the Secretary of State requests
him to abate such pollution, he shall give formal notification
thereof [to the appropriate state and interstate pollution control
agencies] and promptly call a conference . . . if he believes that
such pollution is occurring in sufficient quantity to warrant such
action. The Secretary, through the Secretary of State, shall invite
the foreign country which may be adversely affected by the
pollution to attend and participate in the conference, and the
representative of such country shall, for the purposes of the
conference and any further proceeding resulting from such
conference,
have all the rights of a State water pollution control
138
agency.
The Secretary of State has suggested that "perhaps it is time for the
international community to begin moving toward a consensus that
nations have a right to be consulted before actions are taken which
could affect their environment or the international environment at
large."' 139 The international community has in fact begun moving
toward such a consensus. The Preparatory Committee of the Stockholm Conference proposed in its Draft Declaration that:
Relevant information must be supplied by States on activities or
developments within their jurisdiction or under their control
136. Gardner, Outer Space Problems of Law and Power, 49 Dep't. State Bull. 367, 369 (1963).
137. For insightful discussion, see Kirgis, Technological Challenge to the Shared Environment: United States Practice, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 290 (1972); Cleveland, The Politics of Outer
Space, 52 Dep't State Bull. 1010 (1965).
138. 33 U.S.C. 1160(d)(2) (1969). These requirements are on a reciprocal basis in that the
foreign nation must provide essentially "the same rights" to the United States.
139. Rogers, U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age, 64 Dep't State Bull. 198, 200-21
(1971).
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whenever they believe, or have reason to believe, that such
information is needed to avoid the risk of significant adverse
effects on the environment in areas beyond their national
0

jurisdiction."'14

This was not adopted by the full conference, but it received broad
141
support. It failed largely because of the strong opposition of Brazil.
Following the U.S. example in the space needle and weather
modification matter, no activity should proceed until appropriate
consultations have been carried out in cases in which there is reason
to believe the activity may create significant risk of harm to the
environment.
The notice and consultation procedures would assist in resolving
questions through diplomatic channels before damage has been
caused. Preventive, anticipatory action is crucial in situations of
potential environmental damage.
Equitable utilization requires the input of the interested parties
during the planning process, not after the horse is out of the barn.
The biggest weakness of this suggested prior notice consultation
procedure, of course, is that the proposing party is still the arbiter in
its own cause. Even in the U.S. formulation in the space needle
proposal, the U.S. offered "appropriate consulation" prior to taking
action if "it," the U.S. in its judgement, had reason to believe that its
activity might create significant risk. 142 Similarly, the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act provides for calling an international conference
"when the Secretary of the Interior has reason to believe that any
pollution endangers the health or welfare of persons in a foreign
country" and " if he believes that such pollution is occurring in
sufficient quantity to warrant such action."'143
Ideally, environmental impact studies should be carried out by an
impartial third party, even if only in an advisory capacity. Under such
a scheme, notice would be given not only to the coriparians but to the
advisory body, which could then carry on an independent environmental study, provide a forum for hearing views of the interested
parties, and make an independent judgement. It could follow
guidelines perhaps akin to the National Environmental Policy Act of
the U.S. which requires consideration of:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
140. Principle 20.
141. Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Office of Environmental
Affairs, Dep't of State, UN Conf. on the Human Environment, Roundup of Action Taken 11
(June 21, 1972).
142. See discussion supra note 136.
143. See discussion supra note 138.
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(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm
productivity,
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should
144
it be implemented.

In fact, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, consisting of the western industrialized countries which produce over two-thirds of the world's trade, has established a third party
procedure which has potential for emulation. It calls for early
notification of environmental control measures which would significantly affect international activity, and allows either the OECD
secretariat or a member nation to call into play a "confrontation
mechanism" if it believes a measure will adversely affect it. 145 This
program focuses on the economic impacts of environmental programs,
but it has potential as a model for focusing on the environmental
impacts of economic and developmental programs.
The third party advisory function could be performed by new
international agencies specifically created for the purpose, or by
adding to the competence of existing agencies such as the International Joint Commission for the U.S. and Canada; the International
Boundary and Waters Commission for Mexico and the U.S.; the
Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution; and the
Danube Commission could, by mutual agreement of the coriparians,
be given the additional function. Even if only advisory, this would

improve the procedures for notice and consultation. It would
specifically draw the attention of the coriparians to the environmental
activities which the joint commission has reason to believe may create
a significant risk of harm to the drainage basin in a manner that would
be difficult to ignore. The impact studies would be public documents
with the potential "to energize administrative, legislative or judicial
action."'

46

PROSPECTS FOR OPTIMAL UTILIZATION

Having arrived at a point at which customary international fluvial
law as evidenced by international practice has been distilled and
crystallized by the Helsinki Rules into the doctrine of equitable
utilization, this paper went on in some utopian impulse to suggest
144. 42U.S.C. 4321 §102 (1969).
145. Supra note 5, at 262; OECD Observer 10 (No. 52, 1971).
146. Statement by Prof. Chayes in supra note 5, at 20.
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that as important as the formulation of rules are for the resolution of
international fluvial disputes, it is even more important to establish
international regulatory institutions to administer international fluvial
resources guided by the established doctrine of equitable utilization.
Having already passed the threshold of what is acceptable to the
international community, it is perhaps idealistic to suggest that the
enlightened doctrine of equitable utilization itself, is inadequate. Yet,
there is a narrowness in the doctrine that contains the seeds of
nationalistic inefficiency.
The doctrine of equitable utilization contemplates cutting the
resources of the river basin up into equitable shares, each share to be
independently developed by each coriparian. Each nation is to
independently develop that part of the drainage basin over which it
has jurisdiction and the doctrine prohibits the other riparians from
doing anything which would unreasonably interfere with this national
utilization. The corner stone of the principle is a dividing of the
147
resource that is as fair as possible to all parties.
However, as admirable as equitable independent development may
be, independent development is not likely to make the most
productive use of the resource. 148 With the collision courses being set
by rising population and advancing technology, 149 we are rapidly
approaching the juncture at which, for resource purposes, we must
deemphasize national political borders and emphasize optimum use.
Rather than speaking of equitable utilization, we should begin to
argue for "optimal utilization." Rather than development which is
"separate but equitable" we need development which is unified and
optimal.
Artificial political boundaries rarely encompass the optimum areal
unit for water resource utilization. For optimal utilization, the areal
unit for development and administration of the resource must be
147. Lipper analyzes the goal of "equitable utilization" as threefold:
1. Examination of the . . . needs of the riparian states by an objective
consideration of various factors . . .;
2. Distribution of the waters among the coriparians . . .
3. Accomplishment of the distribution of the waters by seeking to achieve the
maximum benefit for each coriparian consistent with the minimum detriment to
each.
A Garretson, supra note 68, at 45.
148. Sewell divides international river development into three categories: 1) unilateral, 2)
exclusive, and 3) unified. Sewell, The Columbian River Treaty and ProtocolAgreement, 4 Natural
Resources J. 308-15 (1964).
149. Barry Commoner argues that technology and the increased use of synthetic materials is
a greater contributing factor to pollution than increased population. Commoner, supra note 4,
at 8.
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determined by economic, ecologic and geographic considerations
50
rather than the cartographical vagaries of historical accident.'
The optimal areal unit may vary from use to use, and, for some
uses, may extend beyond the basin itself. Waste disposal and thereby
environmental concerns could extend beyond the basin, and certainly
the policy implications of the generation of hydroelectric power often
does extend outside the basin. Blair Bower persuasively observes that:
...

[A] water-resources system does not encompass a single

geographic area, but rather a set of overlapping, but not
necessarily coincident, areas. Each area corresponds to the
demand area of one of the outputs from the system. These
overlapping areas are centered on, but are not necessarily
coincident with, the drainage basin. Further, the areal boundaries

for some of the outputs are subject to change over time as
economic and technological conditions and hence demands for

water-related products change.1 51
Thus, in the administration of international fluvial resources, some
basic organizational recommendations are:
1. Areal Jurisdiction
The basic organizational unit should at least be the drainage basin,
although for some outputs, broader regional groupings may be
desirable. 152 Also, the factors to be considered vary so much from
basin to basin, that a basin approach is desirable since each basin is
unique physically, economically, ecologically, culturally, and politically; therefore the planning considerations and administrative
machinery itself vary from basin to basin. As Professor Bourne aptly
themselves to the application
suggests, "Drainage basins do not lend
153
of principles of ecumenical validity."
Blair Bower succinctly urges that in view of these varying
characteristics of river basins, water administration requires and
agency which:
(a) is unitary, rather than consisting of several agencies;
150. See Craine, Economics of Watershed Planning 84 (Tolley and Riggs eds. 1961). Laylin
and Clagett, Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource Development 432 (Smith and
Castle eds. 1964); Wollman, The Alternative Uses of Water (1962); Krutilla, River Basin
Development (Resources for the Future, 1960); Fox and Craine, OrganizationalArrangements
for Water Development, 2 Natural Resources J. 1, 7 (1962); See Ely and Wollman, supra note 68,
at ch. 4.
151. Bower, Some Physical, Technological,and Economic Characteristicsof Water and Water

Resources Systems: Implicationsfor Administration, 3 Natural Resources J. 220 (1963).
152. L. Teclaff, supra note 9, at 92.
153. Bourne, supra note 21, at 135.
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(b) has jurisdiction, by one means or another, over both quantity

and quality of water and over both surface and ground water;
(c) is regional in areal jurisdiction, but with varying boundaries

corresponding to different outputs;

54

2. Organizational Competence
Each basin authority should have:
(a) planning and policy making authority, including the establishment of water quality standards;

(b) responsibility for the entire spectrum of outputs from the
water resource;
(c) design, operational and supervisory competence;
(d) enforcement authority; and
(e) adjudicatory competence to resolve disputes over violationsand damage claims.
The Rhine Navigation Court is an existing example of international
adjudication jurisdiction. It is limited to navigational questions, and
the Court has criminal jurisdiction to investigate and judge violations
of navigation regulations. It also has civil jurisdiction for damage
(including environmental damage) relating to navigation violations.155
3. Standing
Both individual citizens and governments should have standing to
bring claims for compensation before the adjudicative tribunal. Such
adjudicative jurisdiction would greatly facilitate the compensation of
damage claims. Otherwise, for example, a citizen of the Netherlands,
damaged by pollution placed in the river in Germany, has the choice
of litigating either in Germany or in his own Dutch courts. If he seeks
his remedy in a German court, he faces considerable expense and
inconvenience, plus the burden of proving damage in Holland. Or,
alternately, under the rules of conflicts of laws, he could seek his
remedy in a Dutch court which would apply the lex loci delicti
cominmissi. If he opts for his own Dutch courts, he is faced not only
with the problem of proving extraterritorial causation in Germany,
but he will be trying to assert a claim against a defendant who is and
was outside the jurisdiction of the court. 156 In addition, governments
should have standing since damage to national territory legally is an
injury to the state incurring state to state responsibility. 1 57
154. Bower, suipra note 151, at 237.
155. Supra note 5, at 267.
156.

Lester, suipra note 27, at 849.

157. Sohn and Baxter, Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens (Draft No. 12) 46 (1961).
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4. Appeals
Appeals of decisions of the commission tribunal could be appealed
to an appellate panel composed of a designated justice from the
highest appellate court of each basin state, chaired by a chairperson
selected from a non-basin state by the members of the panel.
5. Dividend Division
states
Profit sharing mechanisms must be developed so that cobasin
158
development.
unified
of
dividends
the
in
equitably
may share
THE ARCHEOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS
Historically we might, like an archeologist uncovering the remains
of prior civilizations, be able to categorize the periods of development of the international law of drainage basins as follows:
Drainage Basin I-Late 19th and Early 20th Century
The Age of the Harmon Doctrine-a short lived period in which
absolute territorial sovereignty was advocated.
Drainage Basin II-First Half of the 20th Century
The Beginnings of the Age of Reason and Sic Utere Tuo-the
principle of limited territorial sovereignty was adopted.
Drainage Basin III-Latter Third of 20th Century
The Helsinki Period of Equitable Utilization-Helsinki Rules
for resolving international drainage basin disputes on basis of
equitable utilization promulgated.
Drainage Basin IV-Late 20th Century
The Two-Tier Period-international commissions established to
initiate studies and make policy recommendations, leaving policy
execution and actual regulation to individual nations.
Drainage Basin V-Early 21st Century
Period of Internationalization-international regulatory commissions are developed to administer drainage basins on the basis
of equitable utilization.
Drainage Basin VI-Mid 21st Century
The Age of Optimal Utilization-the period of maturation of
international joint commissions into River Basin authorities with
authority for policy making, supervision, enforcement and adjudication, operating under the mandate of optimal utilization.
The organizational models are numerous. There undoubtedly will
be a great variety of institutional arrangements established for the
management and control of international drainage basins. But
whatever the administrative pattern, each river basin authority will
be administering a finite resource in the context of increasing demand
for that resource due to the combination of increasing population,
158. For a proposal for sharing the resources of the seabed, See Edwards, A Proposalfor
Participating in Natural Resources Development, Starting With the High Seas, 11 Natural
Resources J. 636 (1971).
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increasing consumption, and accelerating technological development.
Under such pressures, old habits of nationalism as usual must yield
to the concept of optimal utilization.

